In this paper, we describe efficient protocols to perform in parallel many reads and writes in private arrays according to private indices. The protocol is implemented on top of the Arithmetic Black Box (ABB) and can be freely composed to build larger privacypreserving applications. For a large class of secure multiparty computation (SMC) protocols, our technique has better practical and asymptotic performance than any previous ORAM technique that has been adapted for use in SMC. Our ORAM technique opens up a large class of parallel algorithms for adoption to run on SMC platforms. In this paper, we demonstrate how the minimum spanning tree (MST) finding algorithm by Awerbuch and Shiloach can be executed without revealing any details about the underlying graph (beside its size). The data accesses of this algorithm heavily depend on the location and weight of edges (which are private) and our ORAM technique is instrumental in their execution. Our implementation is the first-ever realization of a privacypreserving MST algorithm with sublinear round complexity.
sults of computations. This means that the ABB does not leak anything about the results of the intermediate computations, but only those values whose declassification is explicitly requested by the parties. Hence, any secure implementation of ABB also protects the secrecy of inputs and intermediate computations. There exist a number of practical implementations of the ABB [4, 7, 11, 18, 31, 43] , differing in the underlying protocol sets they use and in the set of operations with private values that they make available for higher-level protocols.
These ABB implementations may be quite efficient for realizing applications working with private data, if the control flow and the data access patterns of the application do not depend on private values. For hiding data access patterns, oblivious RAM (ORAM) techniques [28] may be used. These techniques have a significant overhead, which is increased when they are combined with SMC. Existing combinations of ORAM with SMC report at least O(log 3 m) overhead for accessing an element of an m-element array [34] .
In this work, we propose a different method for reading and writing data in SMC according to private addresses. We note that SMC applications are often highly parallelized, because the protocols provided by ABB implementations often have significant latency. We exploit this parallelism in designing oblivious data access methods, by bundling several data accesses together. In the following, we assume that we have private vector v of m elements (the number m is public, as well as the sizes of other pieces of data). We provide two protocols on top of ABB: for reading its elements n times, and for writing its elements n times. These protocols receive as an input a vector of indices (of length n) and, in case of writing, a new vector of values, and return a vector of selected elements of v, or the updated vector v. The asymptotic complexity of both protocols is O((m + n) log(m + n)), while the constants hidden in the O-notation are reasonable. The protocols themselves are surprisingly simple; the simplicity also being attenuated by the use of the ABB model. Our protocols can be interleaved with the rest of the SMC application in order to provide oblivious data access capability to it.
To demonstrate the usefulness of our protocols in privately implementing algorithms with private data access, and to expand the set of problems for which there exist reasonably efficient privacy-preserving protocols, we provide a protocol for finding the minimum spanning tree (MST) of a sparse weighted graph. The protocol is implemented on top of ABB, i.e. the are no assumptions on which computing party initially knows which parts of the description of the graph. Kruskal's and Prim's algorithms [15] , the best-known algorithms for finding MST (without privacy considerations), are not well suited for a direct implementation on top of ABB, because of their inherent sequentiality. In this paper, we consider a parallel algorithm by Awerbuch and Shiloach [3] (itself an adoption of a MST algorithm by Borůvka [45] ) that runs on a PRAM (Parallel Random Access Machine) in time logarithmic to the size of the graph, using as many processors as the graph has edges. Hence the workload of this algorithm is asymptotically the same as Kruskal's. We adapt it to run on top of our ABB implementation, using the private data access protocols we've developed. The adoption involves the simplification of the algorithm's control flow, and choosing the most suitable variants of our protocols at each oblivious read or write. The efficiency of the resulting protocol is very reasonable; our adoption only carries the cost of an extra logarithmic factor, making the communication complexity of our protocol to be O(|E| log 2 |V |). We believe that the adoption of other PRAM algorithms for SMC is a promising line of research. This paper has the following structure. After reviewing the related work in Sec. 2 and providing the necessary preliminaries, both for the ABB model of SMC and solving MST on PRAM in Sec. 3, we give the actual protocols for parallel reading and writing in Sec. 4 and discuss both their theoretical and practical performance in Sec. 5. We will then present the solution for the private MST problem, describing the adoption of the algorithm described in Sec. 3 to privacy-preserving execution in Sec. 6, again quantifying its performance. We conclude in Sec. 7.
Related work
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) protocol sets can be based on a variety of different techniques, including garbled circuits [57] , secret sharing [8, 24, 48] or homomorphic encryption [16] . A highly suitable abstraction of SMC is the universally composable Arithmetic Black Box (ABB) [21] , the use of which allows very simple security proofs for higher-level SMC applications. Using the ABB to derive efficient privacy-preserving implementations for various computational tasks is an ongoing field of research [2, 14, 17, 41] , also containing this paper.
Protocols for oblivious RAM [28] have received significant attention during recent years [37, 49, 51] . The overhead of these protocols is around O(log 2 m) when accessing an element of a vector of length m, where the elements themselves are short. These ORAM constructions assume a client-server model, with the client accessing the memory held by the server, which remains oblivious to the access patterns. This model is simpler than the SMC model, because the client's and server's computations are not shared among several parties.
In this paper, we use SMC techniques to achieve oblivious data access in SMC applications. This goal has been studied before, by implementing the client's computations in an ORAM protocol on top of a secure two-party computation protocol set [25, 26, 29, 42] , or over an SMC protocol set [20, 34] . For these protocol sets, the overhead of at least O(log 3 m) is reported. Recently, optimizing ORAM to perform well in the secure computation setting has become a goal of its own [54] . The ORAM constructions often allow only sequential access to data, as the updating of the data structures maintained by the server cannot be parallelized. Recently, Oblivious Parallel RAM [9] has been proposed, which may be more suitable for SMC protocol sets where the computations have significant latency.
Our parallel reading protocol essentially builds and then applies an oblivious extended permutation (OEP) [32, 36, 38, 44] (see Sec. 4.1 for details). Our OEP application protocol is more efficient (both in practice and asymptotically) than any other published construction built with SMC techniques. The building of an OEP in composable manner has only been considered in [38] ; our construction is more efficient than theirs. Our writing protocol is similar to the associative map circuit [58] , but optimized for SMC protocol sets based on secret sharing.
There exist privacy-preserving protocols for a number of graph algorithms, e.g. single-source shortest paths and for maximum flow [2, 6, 10, 34] . MST algorithms also belong to this list. Brickell and Shmatikov [10] present a two-party protocol that makes the resulting MST public. Blanton et al. [6] adapt Prim's algorithm for privacy-preserving execution in a way that is asymptotically optimal (in terms of communication complexity) for dense graphs. For both of them, the number of communication rounds is proportional to the number of vertices in the graph.
Preliminaries

Secure Multiparty Computation
Universal Composability
Universal composability (UC) [12] is a framework for stating security properties of systems. It considers an ideal functionality F and its implementation Π with identical interfaces to the intended p users. The latter is at least as secure as the former (or: Π securely implements F), if for any attacker A there exists an attacker A S , such that Π A and F A S are indistinguishable to any potential user Z of either Π or F. Here X Y denotes the systems X and Y (consisting of one or more interactive Turing machines) running in parallel, possibly communicating with each other over the common interface.
The value of the framework lies in the composition theorem. The protocol Π may be implemented in the F-hybrid model. In this case the Turing machines M 1 , . . . , M p that implement the steps of the protocol Π for the p users may additionally access an ideal functionality F for certain steps of the protocol. The protocol Π securely implements an ideal functionality G in the F-hybrid model if for any A there exists A S , such that The existing implementations of ABB are protocol sets Π ABB based on either secret sharing [7, 11, 18] , threshold homomorphic encryption [21, 31] or garbled circuits [22, 42] . Depending on the implementation, the ABB offers protection against a honest-but-curious, or a malicious party, or a number of parties (up to a certain limit). An SMC application may be be built by having an ABB implementation as its component, and invoking the computation commands of the ABB according to the description of the computation realized by this application.
We have used the Sharemind SMC framework [7] for implementing the protocols proposed in this paper. Its implementation of the ABB consists of three parties, providing protection against one honest-butcurious party. The protocols of Sharemind are based on secret sharing over rings.
All ABB implementations provide protocols for computing linear combinations of private values (with public coefficients; formally, the coefficients are part of the operation name op) and for multiplying private values. The linear combination protocol is typically cheap, involving no communication and/or cheap operations with values. When estimating the (asymptotic) complexity of protocols built on top of ABB, it is typical to disregard the costs of computing of linear combinations. There may be other operations provided by the ABB implementation. These operations typically have a cost at least as large as multiplying two private values, and usually much more [8] .
The peformance profiles of ABB implementations based on different SMC constructions are very different. Implementations based on operations with values secret-shared over some ring require less communication among the parties than implementations based on garbled circuits, if the operations the SMC application performs map nicely into the arithmetic operations on that ring. On the other hand, protocols based on garbled circuits may run in constant rounds, while for secretsharing based protocols the number of rounds is at least proportional to the circuit-depth of the computation realized by the SMC application. Hence the parallelizability of the application may be a criterion in choosing the ABB implementation. The extension of a basic ABB has been demonstrated in e.g. [1, 5, 13, 17, 46] , where operations like bit-decomposition, equality and less-than comparisons, fixed-and floating-point, set and multiset operations have been added to the ABB.
Extending an ABB
We present our oblivious data access, as well as private MST operations as extensions to the ABB described in Sec. 3.1.4. In the programs P op we present, we let x denote that some value has been stored in the ABB and is accessible under handle x. The notation z ← x ⊗ y means that F ABB is asked to perform the operation ⊗ with values stored under handles x and y, and the result is stored under handle z. In ABB implementations this involves the invocation of the protocol for ⊗.
Our Initial ABB
In this paper, we require the values stored in the ABB to come from a sufficiently large ring, such that the array indices could be represented by them. Regarding the provided functionality, we require the ABB implementation to provide protocols for equality and comparison operations [8, 17] . We also require the ABB to have oblivious shuffles -private permutations of values -together with operations to apply and unapply them to vectors of values. Given an oblivious shuffle σ for m elements, and a private vector ( It is up to the implementation of an ABB, how oblivious shuffles are represented. We note that Waksman networks [53] can be used to add oblivious shuffles to any ABB, in the sense of Sec. 3.1.3. For certain ABB implementations, including Sharemind, a more efficient implementation is described in [40] . The complexity of the protocols implementing the ABB operations apply, unapply and random_shuffle is either O(m) or O(m log m) (for constant number of parties). The complexity of the composition of a private and a public shuffle is constant.
With oblivious shuffles and comparison operations, the ABB can be extended to sort vectors of private values (of length m) in O(m log m) time, where the size of the constants hidden in the O-notation is reasonable [30] . In our protocols, we let σ ← sortperm( v 1 , . . . , v k ), where v 1 , . . . , v k are vectors of length m, denote the operation that produces an oblivious shuffle σ , such that the application of σ to each of v 1 , . . . , v k would bring them to an order that is componentwise lexicographically sorted (with the v 1 -component being the most significant). We require the sorting obtained through sortperm and shuffle application to be stable.
Parallel algorithms for MST
Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph, where the set of vertices V is identified with the set {1, . . . , |V |} and the set of edges E with a subset of V × V (the edge between vertices u and v occurs in E both as (u, v) and as (v, u)). We assume that the graph is connected. Let ω : E → N give the weights of the edges (ω must be symmetric). A minimum spanning tree of G is a graph T = (V, E ) that is connected and for which the sum e∈E ω(e) takes the smallest possible value.
Kruskal's and Prim's algorithms are the two most well-known algorithms for finding the MST of a graph. These algorithms work in time O(|E| log |V |) or O(|E|+ |V | log |V |) [15] . They are inherently sequential and therefore unsuitable as a basis for our privacy-preserving implementation on top of an ABB implementation based on secret sharing.
Other algorithms for MST have been proposed. Borůvka's algorithm [45] works in iterations. At the beginning of each iteration, the set of vertices V has been partitioned into V 1∪ · · ·∪ V k and for each V i , the minimum spanning tree has already been found (at the start of the algorithm, each vertex is a separate part). For each i, let e i be a minimum-weight edge connecting a vertex in V i with a vertex in V \V i . We add all edges e i to the MST we are constructing and join the parts V i that are now connected. We iterate until all vertices are in the same part. Clearly, the number of iterations is at most log 2 |V | because the number of parts drops to at most half during each iteration.
Borůvka's algorithm seems amenable for parallelization, as the edges e i can all be found in parallel. Parallelizing the joining of parts is more involved. Awerbuch and Shiloach [3] have proposed a parallel variant of Borůvka's algorithm that introduces data structures to keep track of the parts of V , and delays the joining of some parts. Due to the delays, the number of iterations may increase, but it is shown to be at most log 3/2 |V |.
Awerbuch-Shiloach algorithm executes on priority-CRCW PRAM. Parallel random access machines (PRAM) are a theoretical model for parallel computations. In this model, an arbitrary number of processors are available, executing synchronously and sharing common memory. There exist several subclasses of PRAM, depending on how the read/write conflicts to the same memory location are resolved. A CRCW PRAM allows many processors to read and write the same location at the same time. In priority-CRCW PRAM, concurrent writes to the same location are resolved by (numeric) priorities assigned to the write: only the writing operation with the highest priority gets through [33] .
One iteration of the Awerbuch-Shiloach algorithm requires constant time, when executed by |E| processors. The algorithm assumes that all edges have different weights (this does not lessen the generality). We give a thorough description of their algorithm, as we are going to adapt it for privacy-preserving execution in Sec. 6.
The Awerbuch-Shiloach algorithm [3] is presented in Alg. 1. It uses the array T to record which edges have been included in the MST. For keeping track of the partitioning of V , Alg. 1 uses a union-find data structurethe array F that for each vertex records its current "parent". When interpreting the array F as a set of directed edges (v, F [v]) for each v ∈ V , then the directed graph (V, F ) will be a forest of rooted trees throughout the execution of Alg. 1. Initially (as set in line 5), this graph consists of trees of size 1, i.e. each vertex is a root of a tree consisting only of this vertex. In general, a vertex v is currently a root of a tree if F [v] = v. The trees in the forest (V, F ) define the parts in the current partitioning. A rooted tree is called a star if its height is at most 1, i.e. it is either an isolated vertex or a tree consisting of a root and a number of leaves. The correctness of the Awerbuch-Shiloach algorithm depends on the following property: if v is a vertex in a star, then F [v] is the root of that star. 
Algorithm 1: MST algorithm by Awerbuch and Shiloach
The array A records which edges are "active". The algorithm iterates as long as any active edges remain. The body of the while-loop is multi-threaded, creating one thread for each active edge. The changes a thread makes in common data are not visible to other threads until the next Synchronize-statement. In particular, the reads and writes of F in line 10 by different threads do not interfere with each other.
The Awerbuch-Shiloach algorithm joins two parts in the current partitioning of V or, two rooted trees in the forest defined by F , only if at least one of them is a star. Computing, which vertices belong in stars, can be done in constant time with |V | processors. At each iteration of Alg. 1, before executing the lines 9 and 16, the algorithm Alg. 2 is invoked and its output is used to check whether the vertex u belongs to a star.
An iteration of Alg. 1 can be seen as a sequence of three steps, separated by the Synchronize-statements. In first step, the edges to be added to the tree are selected. For each star with root r ∈ V , the lightest outgoing edge is selected and stored in W[r]. This selection crucially depends on the prioritized writing; the writing with smallest priority will go through. Also, the star is made a part of another tree, by changing the F -ancestor of r. In the second step, we break the F -cycles of length 2 that may have resulted from joining two stars. Independently, we also record the edges added to the MST. In the third step, we decrease the height of F -trees, as well as deactivate the edges that attach to a component that is still a star at this step. These edges definitely cannot end up in the MST.
Alg. 2 for checking which vertices belong in stars is simple. If the parent and the grandparent of a vertex differ, then this vertex, as well as its grandparent are not in a star. Also, if a parent of some vertex is not in a star, then the same holds for this vertex.
Oblivious data access
We present the protocols for obliviously reading and writing elements of an array as extensions to the ABB specified in Sec. 3.1.4.
Protocol for reading
In Alg. 3, we present our protocol for obliviously reading several elements of an array. Given a vector v of length m, we let prefixsum( v) denote a vector w, also of length m, where
is a free operation in existing ABB implementations, because addition of elements, not requiring any communication between the parties, is counted as having negligible complexity. We can also define the inverse operation prefixsum
The inverse operation is even easier to compute: 
We see that in Alg. 3, the permutation σ orders the indices which we want to read, as well as the indices 1, . . . , n of the "original array" v. Due to the stability of the sort, each index of the "original array" ends up before the reading indices equal to it. In apply(σ, u), each element v i of v , located in the same position as the index i of the "original array" in sorted t, is followed by zero or more 0-s. The prefix summing restores the elements of v, with the 0-s also replaced with the element Let v = (1, 4, 9, 16, 25) . Let z = (3, 2, 4, 3) . The intermediate values are the following.
-t = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 3, 2, 4, 3) -σ is the permutation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 7 3 6 9 4 8 5 meaning that e.g. the 3rd element in the sorted vector is the 7th element in the original vector.
-v = (1, 3, 5, 7, 9 ) and u = (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 0, 0, 0, 0 ).
-After applying σ to u, we obtain the vector (1, 3, 0, 5, 0, 0, 7, 0, 9). -After prefixsumming, we get the vector (1, 4, 4, 9, 9, 9, 16, 16, 25) . Denote it with y. -After applying the inverse of σ, we get u = (1, 4, 9, 16, 25, 9, 4, 16, 9) . Indeed, to find e.g. u 7 , we look for "7" in the lower row of the description of σ. We find "3" in the upper row, meaning that u 7 = y 3 . -Finally, we return the last n elements of u , which are w = (9, 4, 16, 9).
All values are private, i.e. stored in the ABB. that precedes them. Unapplying σ restores the original order of u and we can read out the elements of v from the latter half of u . A small example is presented in Fig. 1 . By the arguments in Sec. 3.1.3, the protocol presented in Alg. 3 clearly preserves the security guarantees of the implementation of the underlying ABB, as it applies only ABB operations, classifies only public constants and declassifies nothing. Its complexity is dominated by the complexity of the sorting operation, which is O((m + n) log(m + n)). We also note that the round complexity of Alg. 3 is O(log(m + n)).
Instead of reading elements from an array, the elements of which are indexed with 1, . . . , m, the presented protocol could also be used to read the private values from a dictionary. In this case, the elements of the vector v would not be indexed with 1, . . . , m, but with (private) j 1 , . . . , j m . For reading from a dictionary, t i is not initialized with i, but with j i in line 1. The algorithm has to be slightly modified to detect if all indices that we attempt to read are present in the dictionary.
Note that in Alg. 3, the argument v is only used after the dotted line. At the same time, the step that dominates the complexity of the protocol -sorting of t in line 3 -takes place before the dotted line. Hence, if we read the same positions of several vectors, we could execute the upper part of Alg. 3 only once and the lower part as many times as necessary. In Sec. 6, we will denote the upper part of Alg. 3 with prepareRead (with inputs z and m, and output σ ), and the lower part with performRead (with inputs v and σ ). An extended permutation [44] from m elements to n elements is a mapping from {1, . . . , n} to {1, . . . , m} (note the contravariance). The application of an extended permutation φ to a vector (x 1 , . . . , x m ) produces  a vector (y 1 , . . . , y n ) , where y i = x φ(i) . An oblivious extended permutation (OEP) protocol preserves the privacy of x, y and φ. The prepareRead protocol essentially constructs the representation σ of an OEP and the performRead protocol applies it, with better performance than previous constructions.
Protocol for writing
For specifying the parallel writing protocol, we have to fix how multiple attempts to write to the same field are resolved. We thus require that each writing request comes with a numeric priority; the request with highest priority goes through (if it is not unique, then one is selected arbitrarily). We can also give priorities to the existing elements of the array. Normally they should have the lowest priority (if any attempt to write them actually means that they must be overwritten). However, in case where the array element collects the maximum value during some process (e.g. finding the best path from one vertex of some graph to another), with the writes to this element representing candidate values, the priority of the existing element could be equal to this element. This is useful in e.g. the Bellman-Ford algorithm for computing shortest distances. As the priorities of existing array elements are not used in the examples of this paper, we will not explore this further. To take such priorities into account, line 6 of Alg. 4 would have to be changed.
The parallel writing protocol is given in Alg. The writing protocol is secure for the same reasons as the reading protocol. Its complexity is dominated by the two sorting operations, it is O((m + n) log(m + n)), with the round complexity being O(log(m + n)). Similarly to the reading protocol, the writing protocol can be adapted to write into a dictionary instead. Another similarity is the dotted line -the complex sorting operations above the line only use the indices and priorities, while the actual values are used only in cheap operations below the line. For the purposes of Sec. 6, we thus The updated vector w is equal to the first | w| elements of the last row. The update is performed in line 15 of Alg. 4 . All values shown in this example are private, i.e. stored in the ABB. introduce the protocols prepareWrite which executes the operations above the dotted line, and performWrite, executing the operations below the line. The protocol prepareWrite receives as inputs j, p, and the length m of w. The output of prepareWrite is the pair of oblivious shuffles ( σ , τ ). These are input to performWrite together with v and w .
Sorting bits
Alg. 4 makes two calls to the sorting protocol. While the first one of them is a rather general sort, the second one in line 11 only performs a stable sort on bits, ordering the "0" bits before the "1" bits (and the sort does not actually have to be stable on the "1"-bits). In the following we show that the second sort can be performed with the complexity similar to that of a random shuffle, instead of a full sort. Our method leaks the number of 0-s among the bits, but this information was already public in Alg. 4 (being equal to the length of w). The sorting protocol is given in Alg. 5. Here random_shuffle(n) generates an oblivious random shuffle for vectors of length n. The protocol ends with a composition of an oblivious and a public shuffle; this operation, as well as the generation of a random shuffle, is supported by existing implementations of shuffles [40] . 
8 Let ξ be a public shuffle that sorts y 9 σ ← τ • ξ 10 return σ We see that the most complex operations of Alg. 5 are the applications of the oblivious shuffle τ . If the communication complexity of these is O(m) and the round complexity of these is O(1), then this is also the complexity of the entire protocol. The protocol declassifies a number of things, hence it is important to verify that the declassified values can be simulated. The vector b is a random permutation of 0-s and 1-s, where the number of 0-bits and 1-bits is the same as in b . Hence the number of 0-bits is leaked. But beside that, nothing is leaked: if the simulator knows the number n of 0-bits, then b is a uniformly randomly chosen bit-vector with n bits "0" and (m − n) bits "1".
The vector y (computed in constant number of rounds, as all declassifications can be done in parallel) is a random vector of numbers, such that (m − n) of its entries equal (m + 1), and the rest are a uniformly random permutation of {1, . . . , n}. The numbers {1, . . . , n} in y are located at the same places as the 0-bits in b . Hence the simulator can generate y after generating b . Beside b and y, the sorting protocol does not declassify anything else. The rest of Alg. 5 consists of invoking the functionality of the ABB or manipulating public data.
Performance and applicability
Using our algorithms, the cost of n parallel data accesses is O((m + n) log(m + n)), where m is the size of the vector from which we're reading values. Dividing by n, we get that the cost of one access is O((1 + m n ) log(m + n)). In practice, the cost will depend a lot on our ability to perform many data accesses in parallel. Fortunately, this goal to parallelize coincides with one of the design goals for privacy-preserving applications in general, at least for those where the used ABB implementation is based on secret sharing and requires ongoing communication between the parties. Parallelization allows to reduce the number of communication rounds necessary for the application, reducing the performance penalty caused by network latency.
Suppose that our application is such that on average, we can access in parallel a fraction of 1/f (m) of the memory it uses (where 1 ≤ f (m) ≤ m). Hence, we are performing m/f (m) data accesses in parallel, requiring O(m log m) work in total, or O(f (m) log m) for one access. Recall that for ORAM implementations over SMC, the reported overheads are at least O(log 3 m). Hence our approach has better asymptotic complexity for applications where we can keep f (m) small. There exists a sizable body of efficient algorithms for PRAMs. Using our parallel reading and writing protocols, any algorithm for priority-CRCW PRAM can be implemented on an ABB, as long as the control flow of the algorithm does not depend on private data. A goal in designing PRAM algorithms is to make their running time polylogarithmic in the size of the input, while using a polynomial number of processors. There is even a large class of tasks, for which there exist PRAM algorithms with logarithmic running time.
An algorithm with running time t must on each step access on average at least 1/t fraction of the memory it uses. A PRAM algorithm that runs in O(log m) time must access on average at least Ω(1/ log m) fraction of its memory at each step, i.e. f (m) is O(log m). When implementing such algorithm on top of SMC using the reading and writing protocols presented in this note, we can say that the overhead of these protocols is O(log 2 m). For algorithms that access a larger fraction of their memory at each step (e.g. the Bellman-Ford algorithm for finding shortest paths in graphs; for which also the optimization described above applies), the overhead is even smaller.
Experimental Results
We have implemented protocols in Sec. 4 on the Sharemind secure multiparty computation platform (providing security against passive attacks by one party out of three in total) [8] and tested their performance. We measured the time it took to read n values from a vector of length m, or to write n values to a vector of length m. Due to the structure of the algorithms, the timings almost completely depend only on m + n and this has been the quantity we have varied (we have always picked m = n). In our experiments, all values and indices were elements of Z 2 32 . Our performance tests are performed on a cluster of three computers with 48 GB of RAM and a 12-core 3 GHz CPU with Hyper Threading running Linux (kernel v.3.2.0-3-amd64), connected by an Ethernet local area network with link speed of 1 Gbps. The execution time of the reading protocol on this cluster for various values of m + n is depicted in Fig. 3 . We have split the running time into two parts, for preparing the read and for performing the read. We see that for larger values of m + n the preparation is slower by almost two orders of magnitude, hence in the design of privacy-preserving algorithms one should aim for reuse of the results of preparation.
Similarly, the performance measuring results of the parallel writing are depicted in Fig. 4 . Again, we distinguish the running times for preparing and performing the write, with similar differences in running times.
We see that 2 million data accesses against an array of length 2 million require about 1000 seconds. This makes 0.5 ms per access. Of course, such efficiency is possible only if the overlying application supports parallelism to this level. 
Comparison with Previous Work
We are interested in comparing our techniques with the implementations of ORAM over SMC. The performance of actual implementations has been reported in [29, 34, 42] . But as the underlying SMC protocol sets have been rather different from our Sharemind framework, a fair comparison may be difficult. Gordon et al. [29] have implemented ORAM on top of garbled circuits, offering security against one honestbut-curious party. Their set-up uses two servers similar to the ones in our cluster, connected to each other with a 1Gbit/s network link. Reading a 128-bit element of an array with length 0.5 million takes about 22 seconds. This is around 4.5 orders of magnitude slower than our result of reading an element of a vector of 2 million 32-bit elements in 0.5 milliseconds.
This comparison assumes that the application using the oblivious access functionality is sufficiently parallel; the timing of our protocols "0.5 ms per read" is valid for n = 2 · 10 6 parallel reads from an array of length m = 2 · 10 6 . If n m = 2 · 10 6 , then an n-wise parallel read requires around 400 s (by Fig. 3) , or 400/n seconds per read. If, for example, n = 10 5 , then our protocol requires 4 ms per read, or only 3.5 orders of magnitude less time than Gordon et al.'s implementation. The parity with their implementation would be obtained at n ≈ 20. Obviously, the bottleneck of Gordon et al.'s implementation is the network connection between two servers -for each non-XOR binary Boolean operation in the circuit, three ciphertexts have to be sent from one server to the other. If the authors had instead used SMC protocols based on secret sharing over Z 2 , the network communication had been significantly lower. On the other hand, the latency of the network connection might have started to significantly affect the performance. Still, the amount of communication would not have dropped by more than two orders of magnitude -instead of sending a couple of ciphertexts per gate, the communication might have dropped to some bits per gate, but not lower. To match this performance with our protocols, the application using oblivious access must be able to perform at least n ≈ 2000 reads in parallel.
Liu et al. [42] have also implemented ORAM on top of garbled circuits, offering security against one honestbut-curious party. They do not report running times, but the number of block cipher operations that the garbling party executes. Also, they do not report performance numbers for a single ORAM operation, but only for larger applications that perform oblivious reads and writes. On the other hand, they report using the same methods for encoding ORAM as Gordon et al. [29] , hence we believe that the actual access times should be similar as well. Liu et al. [42] improve the use of ORAM in larger SMC applications; their techniques could also be used in conjunction of our oblivious array access protocols, as long as the applications are sufficiently parallelizable.
Keller and Scholl's [34] implementation is probably closest to ours: their ORAM implementation runs on top of SPDZ protocol set [19, 35] , based on additively secret-sharing the values among an arbitrary number of servers. In their implementation, they have used two servers similar to our own, connected with a 1Gbit/s network link. Through an expensive offline preprocess-ing stage and a constant-communication post-execution check, the SPDZ protocol set achieves security against a malicious adversary corrupting all but one server. The secret-sharing has to take place over a field that is sufficiently large for the probability of wrongly passing the post-execution check to be negligible. Keller and Scholl have used GF (2 40 ) to measure the access times of their ORAM over SMC implementation. The online phase of the protocol to multiply two shared field elements is highly efficient in SPDZ, each party having to send just two values to every other party. It is even more efficient than the multiplication protocol in the current implementation of Sharemind, where each party sends a total of five values to the other two computing parties. Hence it may seem that for some SMC application, using an ABB implementation based on the online phase of two-party SPDZ is in general more efficient than the implementation of Sharemind (with three parties).
Unfortunately, the comparison is not that simple. While in this setting, the multiplication protocol of the online phase of SPDZ may be slightly faster than the multiplication protocol of Sharemind, the protocol set of the latter is much larger and contains optimized protocols for many other operations useful in SMC applications, while in SPDZ the other operations have to be realized as compositions of many multiplications [17] . In particular, comparison operations are used in ORAM protocols. In Sharemind, an inequality comparison over Z 2 32 is around an order of magnitude slower than the multiplication [8] . For values additively shared over GF (2 k ), a comparison can be computed with the help of an arithmetic circuit with k multiplications (and a number of free operations) with multiplicative depth log k . Hence we guess that the communication costs of the comparison operations in our implementation of Sharemind and in Keller and Scholl's implementation of the online phase of SPDZ differ by no more than a couple of times.
Keller and Scholl [34] report the execution time for the read of one 40-bit element of a million-element array in their implementation of ORAM over SMC to be around 50 ms. This is around two orders of magnitude slower than in our implementation, when reading in parallel n = 2 · 10 6 elements form an array of length m = 2 · 10 6 . Despite all the differences in underlying protocol sets, we believe this to be a basically fair comparison. Again, the performance of our protocol drops if the available parallelism is smaller. To match the performance of [34] , we need n 10 4 .
Note that none of the implementations in [29, 34, 42] 6 elements, the computation of the scalar product would require 0.5 secondsaround three magnitudes more than our oblivious array access. Additionally, the characteristic vector must be computed; this has similar complexity [39] . We believe that our oblivious read protocol is faster if n 1000. A fair comparison of our results with previously proposed protocols is further complicated by the prepare/perform phases of our protocols, if the application making use of oblivious data access protocols is such, that the shuffle(s) computed by a single invocation of a prepare-protocol (with complexity O((m + n) log(m + n))) can be used by many perform-protocols (with complexity O(m + n)). This would allow the amortization of the expensive parts of our oblivious data access protocols and make them more competitive wrt. ORAMbased protocols.
Privacy-preserving MST
Let the ABB store the information about the structure of a graph and the weights of its edges. There are public numbers n and m, denoting the number of vertices and edges of the graph. The vertices are identified with numbers 1, 2, . . . , n. The structure of the graph is privatethe ABB stores m pairs of values, each one between 1 and n, giving the endpoints of the edges. For each edge, the ABB also stores its weight. The preamble of Alg. 7 specifies the actual data structures (arrays) and the meaning of their elements.
Thanks to working in the ABB model, it is unnecessary to specify which parties originally hold which parts of the description of the graph. No matter how they are held, they are first input to the ABB, after which the privacy-preserving MST algorithm is executed. Even more generally, some data about the graph might ini-tially be held by no party at all, but be computed by some previously executed protocol. The benefit of working in the ABB model are the strong composability results it provides.
The algorithms in Sec. 4 can be used to implement Alg. 1 in privacy-preserving manner (indeed, we will present the MST protocol as an extension to the ABB specified in Sec. 4), if the dependencies of the control flow from the private data (there is a significant amount of such dependencies, mostly through the array A) could be eliminated without penalizing the performance too much. Also, when implementing the algorithm, we would like to minimize the number of calls to prepareRead and prepareWrite algorithms, due to their overheads.
Let us first describe the checking for stars in privacy-preserving manner, as Alg. 2 has a relatively simple structure. Its privacy-preserving version is depicted in Alg. 6. It receives the same mapping F as an input, now represented as a private vector F . As the first step, the protocol finds F • F in privacy-preserving manner, and stores in in G . To find G , we have to read from the array F according to the indices also stored in F . This takes place in lines 1-2 of Alg. 
As next, we prepare to privately perform the assignment in line 4 of Alg. 2. We only want to perform the assignment if F i = G i , hence the number of assignments we want to perform depends on private data. Algorithm 4 presumes that the number of writes is public. We overcome this dependency by assigning to a dummy position each time Alg. 2 would have avoided the assignment in its line 5. We let the vector b to have an extra element at the end and assign to this element for each dummy assignment. In line 6 we compute the indices of vector b where false has to be assigned. Here the operation ? : has the same semantics as in C/C++/Java -it returns its second argument if its first argument is true (1), and its third argument if the first argument is false (0). It can be easily implemented in the ABB:
In line 7 of Alg. 6, the oblivious write is performed. The arguments of obliviousWrite are in the same order as in the preamble of Alg. 4: the vector of addresses, the vector of values to be written, the vector of writing priorities, and the original array. All arguments can be private values. All public values are assumed to be automatically classified. In line 7, all values to be written are equal to false, as in Alg. 2. Hence the priorities do not really matter; we make them all equal to 1 (with the assumption that the priorities for existing elements of b , output by compute_priority in line 6 of Alg. 4, are equal to 0). The result of the writing is a private vector b of length n + 1 that is equal to b in positions that were not overwritten.
Lines 8 and 9 of Alg. 6 correspond to the assignment in line 6 of Alg. 2. First we compute St [F [v] ] for all v (in terms of Alg. 2) by reading from b according to the indices in F . In line 1 we prepared the reading according to these indices. As F has not changed in the meantime, this preparation is still valid and can be reused. Hence we apply performRead to first n elements of b . The conjunction is computed in line 9.
The privacy-preserving MST protocol is given in Alg. 7. We explain it below.
To adapt Alg. 1 for execution on ABB, we first we have to simplify its control flow. Fortunately, it turns out that it is not necessary to keep track which edges are still "active". The outcome of Alg. 1 does not change if all edges are assumed to be active all the time. In this case, only the stopping criterion of Alg. 1 (that there are no more active edges) has to be changed to something more suitable. One could keep track of the number of edges already added to the MST, or to execute the main loop of the algorithm sufficiently many times (log 3/2 n). We opt for the second solution, as otherwise we may 
leak something about the graph through the running time of the algorithm. Alg. 7 first copies around some input data, effectively making the set of edges E symmetric. Throughout this algorithm we assume that x mod m returns a value between 1 and m. In line 2 we negate the weights, as lower weight of some edge means that it has higher priority of being included in the MST. In lines 4 to 7 we initialize F , W and T similarly to Alg. 1. All these vectors have an extra element in order to accommodate dummy assignments. In W , the value (m + 1) corresponds to the value NIL in Alg. 1 -the elements of W are used below as addresses to write into T and (m + 1) indicates a dummy assignment.
Before starting the iterative part of the algorithm, in line 8 we prepare for reading according to the endpoints of edges. The actual reads are performed in each iteration.
As mentioned before, the number of iterations of Alg. 7 (line 9) will be sufficient for all edges of the MST to be found. As discussed before, log 3/2 n is a suitable number. All iterations are identical; the computations do not depend on the sequence number of the current iteration.
An iteration starts very similarly to Alg. 1, running the star checking algorithm and finding for each endpoint u of each edge e the values F [u] and St [u] (in terms of Alg. 1). In line 9 of Alg. 1, a decision is made whether to update an element of F and an element of W. The same decision is made in lines 14-16 of Alg. 7: we choose the address of the element to update. If the update should be made then this address is F e i . Otherwise, it is the dummy address n + 1. In lines 17-19 the actual update is made. As the writes to both F and W are according to the same indices a and priorities ω , their preparation phase has to be executed only once. If the write has to be performed, we write the other endpoint of the edge to F and the index of the edge to W. In line 20 we update T similarly to line 13 of Alg. 1.
Compared to Alg. 1, we have redesigned the breaking of F -cycles and decreasing the height of F -trees, in order to reduce the number of calls to algorithms in Sec. 4. In Alg. 1, the cycles are broken (which requires data to be read according to the indices in F , and thus the invocation of prepareRead, as F has just been updated), and then the F -grandparent of each vertex is taken to be its F -parent (which again requires a read according to F and another invocation of prepareRead). Instead, we will directly compute what will be the F -grandparent of each vertex after breaking the F -cycles, and take this to be its new F -parent.
For this computation, we need the F -parents of each vertex, which we already have in the vector F . We also need their F -grandparents which we store in G, and Fgreat-grandparents, which we store in H. We only need a single call to prepareRead to find both G and H . After breaking the cycles, the F -grandparent of the vertex i can be either i, F i or G i . It is not hard to convince oneself that the computation in lines 25-28 finds the Fgrandparent of i and assigns it to F i . As before, the computations for different vertices are made in parallel. The case-construction in line 28 is implemented as a composition of ? : operations.
Finally, we return the private boolean vector T indicating which edges belong to the MST, except for its final dummy element T m+1 .
Alg. 7 (including Alg. 6) is secure for the reasons given in Sec. 3. 
Experimental Results
We have also implemented Alg. 7 (and Alg. 6) on the Sharemind SMC platform and tested its performance on the same setup as described in Sec. 5. We have varied the number of vertices n and selected the number of edges m based on it and on the most likely applications of our private MST protocol.
We believe the most relevant cases for our protocol to be planar graphs and complete graphs. Planar graphs have m ≈ 3n, if most of its faces are triangles. Complete graphs have m = n(n − 1)/2. We have also considered the case m = 6n as a "generic" example of sparse graphs. The results of our performance tests are depicted in Fig. 5 . These will serve as the baseline for any further investigations in this direction.
Conclusions
We have presented efficient privacy-preserving protocols for performing in parallel many reads or writes from private vectors according to private indices. We have used these protocols to provide a privacy-preserving protocol for finding the minimum spanning tree in a graph; no protocols for this task have been investigated before. To achieve these results, this paper makes use of several novel ideas.
First, we noted that multiparty computations by necessity have to process their data in a parallel fashion, otherwise the costs of network latency are prohibitive. Hence one does not need a protocol for reading or writing one value from a private vector according to private index (with the intent to run many copies of this protocol in parallel). It is sufficient to look for protocols that are efficient only when performing many reads or writes in parallel.
Second, we have noticed that the operations available relatively cheaply in existing ABB implementations allow us to construct such protocols. Our protocols in Sec. 4 are somewhat inspired by the techniques first appearing in [38] , but are significantly more efficient.
Third, we have noticed that many PRAM algorithms become amenable to privacy-preserving implementations without too much overhead, if the protocols in Sec. 4 are available. In this sense, the private MST protocol of Sec. 6 serves just as an example. We have chosen this example because it is very difficult to imagine it to be implemented without the ideas in this paper.
Performance-wise, we have certainly obtained impressive results: a graph with 200,000 vertices and 1,200,000 edges can be processed in nine hours. Also, the set-up of our performance tests is realistic -LAN speeds between servers under control of different parties can easily be achieved through a co-located hosting service that provides physical barriers to the access of individual servers.
As we already mentioned in Sec. 5, our oblivious parallel array access protocols may be used to turn any efficient PRAM algorithm into a privacy-preserving computation, as long as the control flow of the algorithm does not depend on private data. We have already applied these protocols in a number of privacypreserving applications. In [50] , parallel algorithms for string matching have been adapted for SMC. We have also implemented a privacy-preserving Bayesian spam filter, and a privacy-preserving database query engine that keeps track, which original rows contributed to the answers of different queries, in order to provide personalised differential privacy [23] to the answers.
Privacy-preserving MST may also find applications in a number of areas, e.g. for privacy-preserving gene expression data clustering [56] or image processing [55] . The likely real-world data sizes for these applications are in the range of the experiments we reported in Fig. 5 .
